defendant was likely to have been in a depressed state of mind when killing. If a doctor could be found who would testify that such depression amounted to diminished responsibility within the statutory definition, a conviction for murder could be avoided. On a conviction for manslaughter, the judge has a discretion as to sentence. Doctors usually can be found to give this kind of evidence. When the police are satisfied that the killing was done out of compassion, prosecuting counsel usually will not challenge the medical evidence. This leaves it uncontradicted. Uncontradicted medical evidence in general ought to be acceptedand almost always is. Situations such as these are unfair to the judge. He knows that a few short questions would probably topple the evidential house of cards. Should he ask them? Most judges do not; and the result is that a defendant who in strict law is guilty of murder escapes conviction. Some say that this shows how flexible and sensible the law is. Others say that the law ought not to be bent by an understanding being reached by the police, doctors, counsel and judges as to what is a genuine case of 'mercy killing'. Such a decision should be reached by the jury after consideration of all the evidence -and after it has been tested by cross-examination.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's tentative suggestion was based on this argument: 'mercy killing' is probably not what the public generally consider to be murder. Because they do not, the law gets bent to ensure that there is not a conviction for murder. Why should not the law face the realities by taking 'mercy killing' out of the definition of murder? This it could do by making 'mercy killing' an offence different from murder.
The proposal put forward by the Criminal Law Revision Committee has been discussed over a long period. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment considered whether such cases should be taken out of the category of murder and reluctantly came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to find a satisfactory definition of 'mercy killings'. The fundamental problem, the Commission pointed out, was this. Any definition could only be in terms of the motive of the killer. Both English and Scottish law have always eschewed definitions in terms of motive, which is notoriously difficult to establish and cannot, like intent, be inferred from a person's overt acts. How could ajury, for example, decide whether a daughter had killed her invalid father from compassion, from a desire for material gain, from a wish to get rid of a trying burden of care, or from a combination of motives?
These criticisms have great force and will have to be considered most carefully before we make our final recommendation to the Home Secretary. I shall report back to the Committee any criticisms I may hear at this meeting.
Good care or bad law?
Thomas S West OBE MB St Christopher's Hospice Sydenham, London SE266DZ
In paragraph 84 of the Working Paper on Offences against the Person (1976) the Criminal Law Revision Committee state: 'We think the present law is objectionable in that there has to be a charge and conviction of murder in mercy killing cases, unless there is evidence of diminished responsibility, although the defendant may in fact serve a very short prison sentence'. In the submission from the Council ofSt Christopher's Hospice to the Law Revision Committee we rejected the proposal for a new offence of 'mercy killing' as equally objectionable in that it would 'if not encourage, at least acquiesce in and perpetuate the idea of a wrong remedy for an ill remediable by better means'.
Later in our submission we were bold enough to state: 'we believe that the proposal would make bad law' -a statement we expanded on with particular reference to the difficulty of judging (and I use the word advisedly) the motive and the degree of 'compassion' in any
